

of Prizren (P.nr. 679/09) and the Judgment of the District Court of Prizren (Ap.nr. 134/2010, dated 12 October 2010),

Issues the following:

JUDGMENT

The Request for Protection of Legality of the Defense dated 27 October 2010, and the Request for Protection of Legality of the defendant dated 03 November 2010, both directed against the Judgment of the Municipal Court of Prizren (P.nr. 679/09) and the Judgment of the District Court of Prizren (Ap.nr. 134/2010, dated 12 October 2010) are

rejected as inadmissible,

as far as they are directed against the criminal offences under point I of the Judgments on Unlawful Provision of Legal Assistance, contrary to Article 336 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo (CCK);

As for their remaining parts, both Requests for Protection of Legality are

rejected as unfounded,

as per points II and III of the two challenged Judgments on Fraud contrary to Article 261 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CCK.

REASONING

I. Procedural Background

(1) The Municipal Prosecutor in Ferizaj/Urosevac filed an indictment against the defendant dated 22 July 2008 (PP.no.856/08), due to criminal offences of Unlawful Provision of Legal Assistance pursuant to Article 336 paragraph 1 of the CCK committed in continuity and Fraud pursuant to Article 261 paragraph 1 as well as Fraud pursuant Article 261 paragraph 2 of the CCK, in real jointer with the criminal offences as mentioned under counts I and II of the indictment;

(2) The Municipal Court of Prizren by Judgment dated 06 June 2010, P. No. 697/09, found the defendant guilty of having committed the criminal offences of Unlawful Provision of Legal Assistance, contrary to Article 336 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo (CCK); Fraud, contrary to Article 261 paragraph 1 of the CCK and Fraud, contrary to Article 261 paragraph 2 of the CCK; the defendant was sentence with an aggregate punishment of one (1) year and eight (8) months;

- (3) The defendant as well as his Defense Counsel timely have appealed the respective 1st Instance Judgment, due to essential violations of the provisions of criminal procedure, violation of the criminal law, erroneous determination of the factual situation and decision on punishment, proposing to amend the challenged Judgment and acquit the defendant from all charges, or annul the challenged Judgment and return the case back to the 1st Instance for re-trial, or amend the challenged Judgment, thus imposing a more lenient punishment to the defendant;
- (4) On 18 August 2010 in his reply (PPA.no.131/2010) the District Public Prosecutor proposed to reject both appeals as ungrounded and affirm the 1st Instance Judgment in its entirety.
- (5) By Judgment Ap.No.134/2010 dated 12 October 2010 the District Court of Prizren found the defendant guilty of having committed the criminal offences of Fraud, contrary to Article 261 paragraph 1 of the CCK and Fraud, contrary to Article 261 paragraph 2 of the CCK as per counts II and III of the indictment, whereas the Judgment of the Municipal Court of Prizren regarding count I of the indictment on Unlawful Provision of Legal Assistance, contrary to Article 336 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo (CCK) was quashed and the case was sent back to the 1st Instance for re-trial;
- (6) On 16 July 2009 the defendant filed a Request for Protection of Legality against both, the Judgment of the Municipal Court of Prizren dated 06 June 2010, P. No. 697/09, and the Judgment of the District Court of Prizren, Ap.No.134/2010 dated 12 October 2010, thus challenging both Judgments for violation of the criminal law, essential violation of the criminal procedure pursuant Article 403 paragraph 1 of the Kosovo Code on Criminal Procedure (KCCP) and other violations of provisions of the criminal procedure and proposed the Supreme Court of Kosovo to review the evidence presented in the Request for Protection of Legality about the Judgment rendered by the District Court of Prizren and to modify the Judgment of the Municipal and District Court of Prizren, acquit him from all the charges and send the case back to the Municipal Court for re-trial;
- (7) On 27 October 2010 the Defense Counsel of the defendant filed a Request for Protection of Legality as well, thus challenging both Judgments for substantial violation of criminal procedure law of Article 403 paragraph 1 of the KCCP and other violations of the provisions of criminal procedure as well as for violation of the criminal law and proposing to have both Judgments annulled; moreover, the defendant proposed to delay the execution of the District Court Judgment until the Request for Protection of Legality would be decided upon.
- (8) On 10 November 2010 the Office of the State Prosecutor of Kosovo (OSPK) filed a motion to the Supreme Court of Kosovo and proposed to reject both Requests for Protection of Legality against the challenged Judgments of the Municipal and the District Court of Prizren as ungrounded as per points II and III of the Judgments, and

dismiss both requests as inadmissible, as far as they are directed against the criminal offences under point I of the Judgments, which the latter would not be final.

(9) On 02 March 2011 the defendant requested EULEX to take over the case, which the latter was accepted by the President of the Assembly of EULEX Judges.

II. Supreme Court Findings

The Supreme Court finds the following:

I. Admissibility of the Request for Protection of Legality

The Requests for Protection of Legality are admissible, as far as they are directed against the Judgments of the Municipal and the District Court of Prizren regarding points II and III of the respective verdicts.

Article 451 of the KCCP as relevant in the case at hand stipulates as follows:

- (1) *A request for protection of legality against a final judicial decision [...] may, after the proceedings have been completed in a final form, be filed [...].*
- (2) ...

Commentaries on the old law, in particular on Article 416 of the Yugoslav Law on Criminal Procedure (LCP), which regarding a motion on protection of legality to be filed by the prosecution was talking about "effective decisions", agree upon the view that "a motion for protection of legality could be filed [...] but always with a condition that is the matter of effectively accomplished proceedings in any phase or stage of the procedure" (Brank Petric; *Commentary on the Law on Criminal Procedure; 1986; 2nd edition, Official Gazette of the SFRY; Belgrade; Article 416, item II.4.*) meaning that "the motion is appropriate only if the violation of the law cannot be rectified through any other legal means" (Momcilo Grubac & Tihomir Vasiljevic; *Commentary on the Law on Criminal Procedure; 1986; 2nd edition, "Savremena Administracija" Belgrade; Article 416, item (7)* with reference to *Supreme Court of Croatia Kzz 6/78 dated 15 February 1978*).

The same applies for the extraordinary legal remedy of defendants "who have been effectively sentenced to a prison sentence" and who "can submit a request for an extraordinary revision of an effective verdict", according to Article 425 paragraph 1 of the LCP.

The Supreme Court of Kosovo, considering the enacting clause of the challenged District Court Judgment, in the case at hand understands that through the latter the Verdict of the Municipal Court of Prizren was annulled as per its point I regarding the charge of Unlawful Provision of Legal Assistance pursuant Article 336 of the CCK.

whereas the Municipal Court Judgment was confirmed in its remaining parts, meaning the accusations and sentence on Fraud pursuant Article 261 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CCK. The latter in particular illuminates from the fact that the District Court has built a new aggregate punishment, considering the two upheld aspects of the Municipal Court Judgment.

For the same reason, the Requests for Protection of Legality are inadmissible as far as they are directed against point I of the challenged Municipal Court Judgment, since the latter was annulled and sent back for re-trial by the District Court. Therefore, this part of the case is not yet final and not all regular legal remedies have been used so far.

As to their remaining parts, both Requests for Protection of Legality have been filed with the competent Court pursuant to Article 453 of the KCCP and within the deadline of Article 452 paragraph 3 of the KCCP.

2. Procedures followed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court panel has decided in a session as described by Article 454 paragraph 1 of the KCCP. Parties have not been notified of the session, since according to art. 451 through 460 of the KCCP there is no obligation for the Supreme Court to notify the parties.

3. On the merits of the Requests for Protection of Legality

a. Essential violations of the criminal procedure:

aa. Alleged violation of Article 403 paragraph 1 item 12 of the KCCP:

The Defense has challenged that both Judgments would show inconsistency between the enacting clause and the reasoning and would lack grounds of material facts regarding the acts of alleged Fraud, committed by the defendant. Therefore, Article 403 paragraph item 12 of the KCCP would be violated.

The Supreme Court of Kosovo finds that neither the 1st nor the 2nd Instance Judgment does essentially violate Article 403 paragraph 1 item 12 of the KCCP.

The enacting clause of the Municipal Court Judgment particularly contains all formal requirements of the law as stipulated by Article 396 paragraphs 3 through 5 as read with Article 391 of the KCCP and clearly states point by point and also mentioning the respective criminal actions on the ground, what the defendant was found guilty for and then – in the context of setting up an aggregate punishment – lists in detail how this punishment was calculated based on each single criminal act as committed by the defendant.

The enacting clause of the challenged Municipal Court Judgment is also in full compliance with the reasoning of the Judgment, which the latter moreover is clear and consistent in itself. Particularly regarding the evidence on points II and III of the Judgment on Fraud as committed by the defendant, the 1st Instance Court has very thoroughly assessed all available evidence and at length analyzed the statements of all witnesses available and specifically the ones of R. M. and F. K. (p.7-11 of the English version).

The argument of the Defense Counsel that there would be no evidence in the reasoning concerning the defendant having intentionally undertaken concrete incriminated deeds is without merits and ungrounded. Despite the Court clearly pointing out that in all cases the defendant had acted with intention to gain unlawful material benefit, it in the case at hand goes without saying that the respective actions of the defendant as described by the witnesses and thus established by the Court cannot be committed by negligence but need intention.

Finally the Supreme Court finds that the Defense Counsel did not specify any other aspect of lacking or insufficient evidence in the context given.

The same applies to the 2nd Instance Judgment. Its enacting clause is clear with regard to the criminal offenses approved as well as to the part of the 1st Instance Judgment, which was annulled and sent back for re-trial. Also the decision on punishment of the 2nd Instance Judgment is clear. The Court beyond all doubts has stated that from the separate punishments of the upheld parts of the Municipal Court Judgment a new and thus reduced aggregate punishment was built. Also here, the enacting clause fully matches with the reasoning of the Judgment.

Also the reasoning of the challenged District Court Judgment is clear and consistent in itself. In a very precise manner the 2nd Instance Court has pointed out what and why the Municipal Court has properly assessed all evidence and found an acceptable decision on points II and III of the Judgment on Fraud as committed by the defendant. The 2nd Instance Court moreover has also very clearly explained its reasons to annul the Municipal Court Judgment regarding its point I on Unlawful Provision of Legal Assistance as per Article 336 of the CCK, thus pointing out that the Municipal Court had taken that the defendant had committed the respective criminal offences in continuance, which the latter would not be regulated by the law and therefore just be an issue of judicial practice. This as a consequence may lead to an even harsher punishment of the defendant under point I of the challenged Judgments.

In both cases, the enacting clause therefore clearly states the legal qualification and the acts of which Ramadan Sylejmani has been found guilty as well as the punishment imposed.

The Supreme Court moreover finds that the enacting clause of both Judgments is also fully supported by the factual findings and the assessment of evidence as given in the respective reasoning.

Last but not least the Supreme Court of Kosovo refers to its permanent adjudication as to which *"it is on the trial court to hear, assess and weigh the evidence at the trial [and that] therefore, the trial court [must be given] a margin of the deference in reaching its factual findings. It should not disturb the trial court's findings it substitute its own, unless the evidence relied upon by the trial court could not have been accepted by any reasonable tribunal of fact, or where its evaluation has been 'wholly erroneous'"* as established in the case *Runjeva, Akgami and Dema (Supreme Court of Kosovo, AP-KZ 477/05 dated 25 January 2008, p.20 (English version)* and repeated and further developed amongst others in the case against Florim Ejupi (*Supreme Court of Kosovo, Pkl-Kzz 71/09 dated 10 October 2009*) and against Jeton Kiqina (*Supreme Court of Kosovo, Ap.-Kz. No. 84/2009 dated 03 December 2009*).


bb. Alleged violations of Article 403 paragraph 1 item 8 of the KCCP:

The defendant has challenged both Judgments claiming that the Investigation Police Officer M... J..., while obtaining police statements from the witnesses M... and F... K... has blackmailed and threatened both of them, telling that he would send them to Dubrava jail, if they would not change their statements and state instead what he, the Police Officer, wanted them to state. Since both Courts had followed the respective witnesses, they had violated Article 403 paragraph 1 item 8 as well as Articles 153, 155 paragraph 1 items 1 and 3 and 161 item 4 of the KCCP.

Reference is made to what already was said about the assessment of evidence as carried out by the Municipal Court of Prizren and that the Supreme Court of Kosovo does not substitute the evidence as assessed by the respective trial court.

cc. Alleged violation of Article 404 item 1 of the KCCP:

Moreover, the defendant in his Request for Protection of Legality claims that the District Court of Prizren had violated Article 404 item 1 of the KCCP, when affirming the punishment imposed by the 1st Instance Court on points II and III of the respective Judgment, which is on Fraud pursuant Article 261 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CCK. The Court particularly had not taken into consideration that the witnesses Fatmire Krasniqi and Ragip Mihalica – as they had accepted in writing – have stated that in particular Ragip Mihalica had given a wrong statement in front of the 1st Instance Court, since he had been manipulated by Police Officer M... J..., and that Fatmire Krasniqi had confirmed in writing that whatsoever she and Har... S... had done had happened based on an agreement with the defendant.



The Supreme Court of Kosovo in this regard finds that both witnesses have been very clear and beyond all doubts concerning all relevant facts.

The witness R [redacted], who in fact was compensated by insurance company "Siguria" with an amount 12.198,- Euro, – as far as this is of interest in the context given - has stated as follows:

"The first time when he [the defendant] came to my house, the defendant Ramadan Sylejmani introduced himself not as prosecutor but as lawyer.[...] It is true that Ramadan brought the money in our house and for this I was told by my sister Hebibe and that [it was] only €6000 (six thousand Euro). I knew about this as soon as I came from the work, but at that moment I was not present there. In our house we do not know how much money was allocated to us from the insurance company but [concerning] the €6000 that he brought in our house the defendant Ramandan Sylejmani told us 'this is the amount that is allocated to you'. I do not know, how much was allocated from the insurance company for the compensation of the damage in the name of my brother, respectively I do not know the amount of money. [...] It is true that Ramadan Sylejmani together with his spouse H [redacted] were here at my house and told me that 'You need to say that you took all the money and this you should tell also to the police'. Whereas the second time when the defendant Ramadan with his spouse F [redacted] came told my family that 'if Ramadan goes in prison for that job you need to return those €6000 which he gave you' " (witness statement of R [redacted] M [redacted] dated 25 February 2010, p.1 and 3 of the English version).

The witness in the respective context has stated further that the whole situations had come up to him on the background of an accident of his brother and related compensation claim against the insurance company. In addition, after the witness having had reported to the police he had been approached in the streets by a friend of the defendant, who had asked him to go to the police again and change his statement. However, the witness in front of the Court has underlined that he never did so and that he always would stick to his statement given.

The witness F [redacted] & **K** [redacted] – as far as relevant here – has on 08 April 2010 stated in front of the Court as follows:

"[w]e had this traffic accident where I suffered bodily injuries. I remember the name of the person H [redacted] and she is a wife of Ramadan Sylejmani, the accused. I did not know Ramadan Sylejmani. One day I met with H [redacted] who I knew from before, as we were talking the same asked me what happened to you, and I explained that I had a traffic accident and I suffered injuries, and she asked me whether I was compensated for this, I said no, and she told me that you could get compensation from the insurance company. That day when I met with H [redacted] where we had this conversation, the same offered me assistance to get the money from the insurance company. [...] I was materially compensated by the insurance company, and I received the means from H [redacted]. It is true that H [redacted] came to my house and

brought the money in amount of 13.000 Euro. On that day when she brought the money the amount of 13.000 Euro she asked me whether I could let her keep 7.000 Euro and I will return them in a couple of days. [...] One day, I do not remember the date police officers from the police station in Ferizaj came to my house and asked me to go to the police station to give a statement regarding the money I have received on behalf of the damage compensation from the traffic accident. [...] During the conversation with Hanmije, she told me to go to the police station and explain as we have discussed that I have received 13.000 Euro from H. [...] whereas the remaining 7.000 Euro she owed me and she would return some other way. During our telephone conversation H. [...] offered me to hire a lawyer for me and said that if you want to do so, the lawyer is waiting at "Goges" coffee shop, and I responded positively, respectively I said that I don't mind if she hires a lawyer. I don't know the reason why H. [...] wanted to hire a lawyer for me, but I think that the reason was that she wanted me to have a lawyer present while I give the statement in the police. [...] I remember very well that police officers told the lawyer that you don't have to stay during the questioning and the same left the office, whereas I continued with the statement. Throughout the statement my brother A. M. [...] was present. [...] In the question of the court the same stated that I know the amount of money that belonged to me from the compensation and it's in the amount of 20.000 Euro. [...] At the moment the cash was delivered to me, he didn't show me any document regarding the amount for which I was compensated by the insurance company. It is true that I have signed the authorization in the lawyer's office in Ferizaj but I don't know his name. As far as I know I gave the authorization while signing the same to H. [...] In a question of the defense, [...] the same stated that until today he didn't return to me this 7000 euro".

The Municipal Court of Prizren then has thoroughly assessed the statement given by the witness and pointed out in detail, why and in which regard the witness and her statement were found reliable, and why this in other parts was evaluated differently. The Court moreover – and this deems decisive – has established that the payment order of the insurance company "Siguria" no. 1351/2006, dated 29 November 2006 and in favor of the witness F. [...] K. [...], transferred the compensation amount of 20.000,- Euro to the bank account no. 1407000006189061 of the Economic Bank, which the latter was held by the defendant Ramadan Sylejmani. The Court moreover has established that the respective amount of money has been withdrawn again from the bank account on 20 December 2006 (*Municipal Court Judgment, p.11. of the English version*).

The District Court of Prizren has analyzed the reasoning of the 1st Instance in detail and has found that with regard to point II and III of the challenged Judgment the defendant and his Defense Counsel cannot be heard with their appeals. The District Court found that the allegations of the defendant and the Defense Counsel as mentioned there, in particular that the factual situation had been established erroneously by the Municipal Court and as a consequence the assessment of evidence in the Main Trial as well as the Court's conclusions regarding the decisive facts had been erroneous and incomplete, would be groundless. The District Court in its

reasoning then refers to the facts established despite the witness statements, which are the amounts of money paid by the insurance company "Siguria" at one side and the sums as handed to the witnesses by the defendant at the other side (*District Court Judgment, p.4 of the English version*).

Of course, the Supreme Court of Kosovo finds that the District Court of Prizren has not checked on the credibility of the witnesses F. [redacted] and R. [redacted] on the background of the allegations raised by the Defense and the defendant in the course of their appeal regarding Kosovo Police Officer M. [redacted] J. [redacted], the latter having influenced both witnesses in order for them to change their statements as given in front of the police. It in this regard is noteworthy that the defendant, who in the course of the appeal has accused M. [redacted] J. [redacted] of being a well known criminal intending to harm the defendant, has raised similar allegations again in his Request for Protection of Legality.

The Supreme Court of Kosovo in the context given finds it crucial to reiterate that the contestation of the judgments on ground of factual situation is inadmissible pursuant to Article 451 (2) of KCCP. However, the Defense in the first place may have intended to challenge the reliability of the respective witnesses and thus the admissibility of evidence as per Article 403 paragraph 1 item 8 of the KCCP.

Having checked also the statements of the witnesses F. [redacted], K. [redacted] and R. [redacted] M. [redacted] as given in front of the respective Kosovo Police Officer M. [redacted] J. [redacted], the Supreme Court of Kosovo has established the following:

The witness R. [redacted] M. [redacted] has stated on 15 May 2008, saying that *"...a cousin of mine introduced me with a lawyer named Ramadan Sylejmani from Ferizaj, Ramadan came to our house and told me if you want [me] to get you the money we need to split if fifty fifty, I told him that I don't have money to give you, he said that you will give me the money when I get them, after one month while I was at work the lawyer Ramadan Sylejmani came to our house and gave to my sister H. [redacted] 6000 Euro (six thousand euro), we used this money for medicines to cure our brother A. [redacted], but they were not enough so we added some of our own money, but still our brother is not well"* and that *"[o]nce before we received the money I went to ask him [the defendant] what happened with the case, and he told me that my brother is entitled to 6000 Euro only, I told him that I think that is too little, and he told be that that is all. He told us that he received only 6000 Euro"*.

The witness F. [redacted] K. [redacted] has described the situation even worse that she did in front of the Municipal Court of Prizren, when she on 10 July 2008 stated that *"[i]n February this year Hanmije came at my place and brought me my money and said she got only 13000 euro not more and I took the money in my house in the presence of my little kids 2 years old. I was happy to get the money and I thanked H. [redacted] and asked her if she wanted to get paid but she said it wasn't necessary, only buy her dinner sometimes if I wanted to. I do not know how much money H. [redacted] withdrew in my name, but I only took 13000 euro and I do not know about any other money"*.

Moreover, "...one month ago or more she [redacted] was at my house and told me if police asked about the money I should say I got 20000 euro but not only 13000 because she said she would give me the rest of the money she kept".

The Supreme Court of Kosovo therefore finds that there was no need for the District Court of Prizren to check on the allegation of the defendant that Kosovo Police Officer M. [redacted] had influenced the witnesses to change their statements in front of the Court. *De facto*, the witnesses obviously have not changed their statements as given to the police, when they were invited to state in front of the Municipal Court of Prizren.

It in this context additionally needs to be stressed that both witnesses in the course of their statements in front of the Municipal Court have been asked about alleged requests by the defendant to change their statements. They have declared that this was not the case. On this background, the handwritten declarations of the respective witnesses as presented by the defendant, despite the question, whether or not they really originate from the witnesses, do not drive the Supreme Court to a decision to have all the statements re-considered again.

As already pointed out twice in the course of this Judgment, the Supreme Court does not substitute the evidence as assessed by the trial instances.

b. Violations of the criminal law:


aa. Violation of the criminal law through violation of the criminal procedure:

The Defense has challenged that both Judgments would violate the criminal law generally to the disadvantage of the defendant, since circumstances and evidence to exclude the criminal liability of the defendant had not been taken into consideration. Thus, particularly Article 408 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the KCCP had been violated.

Despite that Article 408 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the KCCP as referred to by the Defense does not exist and the real provision of Article 408 of the KCCP rules upon serving a copy of the appeal to the opposite side, which the latter has no links with the case at hand, reference is made to what was pointed out before under item a. of this Judgment regarding an alleged violation of criminal procedure. Since it was found that no essential violations of criminal procedure can be established, the argument of the Defense Counsel in the context given is without merits as well.

bb. Violation of Articles 1 and 3 of the CCK:

The defendant is of the opinion that both, the Municipal and the District Court of Prizren have violated Articles 1 and 3 of the CCK, which forbid drawing analogies in



the fields of criminal law and require that in case of ambiguity a criminal offence shall be interpreted in favor of the defendant.

Reference is made to what already was pointed out before. The Supreme Court finds that as well the Municipal Court of Prizren as the District Court of Prizren has properly subsumed the actions of the defendant under the criminal law and that no forbidden analogies can be identified at all. This even applies to the fact that the District Court has annulled the 1st Instance Judgment as per its point I and sent the case back for re-trial. As pointed out before, the annulment was not done due to improper application of the material criminal law by the Municipal Court, but considering the fact that the actions of the defendant were taken as committed in continuity.

cc: Violation of Article 6 of the CCK:

The defendant finally is of the opinion that the respective actions undertaken by the defendant would not match the requirements of the criminal offences he was found guilty for.

Reference is made to what was already established before in this Judgment. The Supreme Court of Kosovo does not find any wrong application of the material criminal law or any failure to properly subsume the facts under the law as carried out by either the Municipal or the District Court.

III. Conclusion of the Supreme Court of Kosovo

For the abovementioned reasons, the Supreme Court concludes that the Request for Protection of Legality is unfounded and therefore is rejected, while both, the Judgment of the District Court of Prizren as well as the Judgment of the Municipal Court of Prizren as far as upheld in the 2nd Instance are affirmed.


Due to that, also the enforcement of the Judgments is not terminated until final decision, as proposed by the defendant.

Consequently, the Supreme Court of Kosovo decides on the respective requests for Protection of Legality as in the enacting clause, based on art. 457 paragraph 1 item 2 of the KCCP.

SUPREME COURT OF KOSOVO IN PRISHTINE/PRISTINA
Pkl-Kzz 69/2010, date 03 May 2011




Presiding judge:



Gerrit Marc-Sprenger
EULEX Judge

Recording clerk:





Adnan Isufi
Legal Advisor

Members of the panel:



Emine Mustafa
Supreme Court Judge





Marije Ademi,
Supreme Court Judge

Legal Remedy:

No request for protection of legality may be filed against a decision of the Supreme Court of Kosovo in which a request for protection of legality was decided upon (Article 451 paragraph (2) of the KCCP).